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Abstract: Since its emergence in China in 1996, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 has
spread across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Countries had to promptly implement control and prevention mea-
sures. Numerous research and capacity building initiatives were conducted in the affected regions to improve
the capacity of national animal health services to support the development of risk-based mitigation strategies.
This paper reviews and discusses risk assessments initiated in several South-East Asian and African countries
under one of these projects. Despite important data gaps, the risk assessment results improved the ability of
policy makers to design appropriate risk management policies. Disease risk was strongly influenced by various
human behavioral factors. The ongoing circulation of HPAIV H5N1 in several Asian countries and in Egypt,
despite major disease control efforts, supports the need for an interdisciplinary approach to development of
tailored risk management policies, in accordance with the EcoHealth paradigm and the broad concept of risk
governance. In particular, active stakeholders engagement and integration of economic and social studies into
the policy making process are needed to optimize compliance and sustainable behavioral changes, thereby
increasing the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its emergence in China in 1996 (Xu et al. 1999),
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1
(HPAIV H5N1) has spread across Asia, Africa, and Europe.
It is now endemic in several Asian countries and in Egypt
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
2011). Within these pockets of infection, interrelated agro-
ecological and socio-economic features of poultry pro-
duction systems create niches in which the virus can be
maintained, and from which it can spread secondarily. For
example, a high density of ducks, a species which can be
infected asymptomatically depending on age (Londt et al.
2010) and virus strain (Hulse-Post et al. 2005), promotes
undetected local virus circulation and potential amplifica-
tion. The husbandry practices associated with duck feeding
on rice paddy fields increase the direct and indirect contact
rate between flocks, thus facilitating virus spread (Gilbert
et al. 2008). Fostered by the rising demand for fresh meat
and meat products, legal and illegal trade of live poultry,
and poultry products are known to play a major role in
virus dissemination within and beyond these pockets of
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infection (Kung et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2010; Kim et al.
2010; Soares Magalhaes et al. 2010; Desvaux et al. 2011;
Fournie et al. 2013). Along trade routes, live bird markets
are likely to contribute to virus amplification and persis-
tence (Fournie´ et al. 2011; Fournie´ et al. 2012b).
Mitigation measures must target the drivers of disease
dynamics. As these drivers are likely to be context-specific,
varying from one area to another, generic interventions are
insufficient and control or prevention strategies should be
adapted to the local characteristics of the targeted poultry
production system.
Interventions which ignore these local characteristics
are not only cost-inefficient and unsustainable, but may
also have an undesirable impact on disease dynamics.
Suboptimal vaccination coverage may reduce the sensitivity
of passive surveillance, delaying outbreak detection
(Walker et al. 2010) and even increasing flock infectious-
ness (Savill et al. 2006). Mass culling implemented in the
absence of an effective compensation policy may promote
under-reporting, the incorrect and unsafe disposal of car-
casses, or the covert selling of infected poultry in the live
bird market system (Yupiana et al. 2010). Banning of
poultry trade may lead to the development of illegal trade
networks which are more difficult to monitor and control
(Webster 2004).
Adopting a system-wide approach (Pfeiffer et al.
2012a) is, therefore, not only essential to understanding
factors influencing the persistence of the virus in these
pockets of infection and its spread beyond them, but is also
central to assessing how potential interventions, and devi-
ation from their optimal implementation, may change the
disease dynamics. Methods intended to inform and support
local policy making are much needed.
Risk assessment refers to the scientific component of
the risk analysis framework, as defined in the OIE Terres-
trial Animal Health Code (World Organisation for Animal
Health 2012a). It is a systematic and comprehensive ap-
proach which aims to identify and assess a risk, i.e., the
probability of occurrence of an unwanted event involving a
specified hazard, and the resulting consequences. Once the
hazard has been characterized, the risk pathways are spec-
ified: they describe the series of dependent steps leading to
the unwanted event under study. The probability of the
occurrence of the unwanted event is obtained by combin-
ing the probabilities estimated for each of these steps. Fi-
nally, the overall risk is assessed by combining this
probability of occurrence, with the consequence estimate,
which may be a probability or a measure of severity. In
quantitative risk assessment, the combination of probabil-
ities is typically multiplicative, while for the qualitative
approach where the risk is expressed using words, combi-
nation matrices are usually used.
The full specification of the risk pathways allow a
systematic and transparent description of (i) the drivers of
disease spread and maintenance, (ii) their interrelations,
and (iii) the factors modulating them. The uncertainty
associated with the lack of knowledge regarding the pro-
cesses in play and their parameter values can be accounted
for, and their effect on the risk estimate can be explored.
Within this framework, risk reduction interventions can be
targeted toward the local drivers of disease spread, main-
tenance, or introduction within a given system. The impact
of deviation from their optimal implementation on the risk
can be assessed. Risk assessment is a versatile decision-
support tool applicable to a range of hazards, risks, and
systems, and able to inform the development of tailored
risk management strategies.
The large-scale epidemics of HPAI H5N1 that started
in South-East Asia in 2003 caught the animal health ser-
vices largely unprepared, and resulted in the affected
countries having to adapt rapidly to the new situation. At
the time, national animal health services had only very
limited if any technical capacity to perform structured risk
assessments as the basis for development of risk manage-
ment strategies. This changed during the following years
when a large number of research and capacity building
initiatives funded from national and international sources
were conducted. One of these was the DFID-funded Pro-
Poor HPAI Risk Reduction project (Department for
International Development 2007) which was jointly led by
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions, International Livestock Research Institute, Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute, University of
California (Berkeley), and the Royal Veterinary College.
The objective of this paper is to review and discuss the
structured risk assessments performed under this project in
various countries in South-East Asia and Africa.
METHODS AND RESULTS
The Pro-poor HPAI Risk Reduction project conducted risk
assessments in seven countries in 2007–2009—Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Ethio-
pia—with the aim of supporting policy makers in the de-
sign of mitigation measures for HPAI H5N1 at national
Solenne Costard et al.
Author's personal copy
and/or regional levels, while limiting negative impacts on
the livelihood of the poor.
The epidemiological context of the seven countries
with regard to HPAI H5N1 varied widely at the time of the
study. In 2008, policy makers in Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Nigeria—all considered endemic for HPAI—were inter-
ested in informing risk mitigation strategies by better
understanding the mechanisms of disease transmission
within the poultry production systems. In Indonesia, the
disease was first reported in 2004 and is now endemic
(Fournie´ et al. 2012a). The disease has been considered
endemic in several islands (EMPRES/GLEWS 2012). Viet-
nam was affected by three major outbreak waves between
2004 and 2006 and has since then experienced regular
outbreaks at a low incidence level (Pfeiffer et al. 2007;
Pfeiffer et al. 2011). Vietnam and Indonesia are amongst
the three countries with most human cases reported to
WHO (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012;
Fournie´ et al. 2012a; World Health Organization of the
United Nations 2013). Nigeria was the first African country
to report HPAI H5N1 in 2006 (Joannis et al. 2008; Metras
et al. 2013). No outbreaks have been reported in Nigeria
since 2009 (Fournie´ et al. 2012a; World Organisation for
Animal Health 2012b; Metras et al. 2013). Thailand expe-
rienced outbreaks in early 2004 and 2005, but has not had
any outbreaks since 2008 (Pfeiffer et al. 2012b). Ghana
experienced a short incursion of HPAI H5N1 in 2007 and
outbreaks were considered resolved in 2008 (Turkson 2009;
Fournie´ et al. 2012a). Policy makers from Thailand and
Ghana aimed to reduce the risk of disease re-introduction
into the country or into a compartment of the production
system. Finally, in Kenya and Ethiopia, where HPAI H5N1
had never been reported (Onkundi 2009; Siraw and Chaka
2009), policy makers’ concern was the design of effective
prevention measures against HPAI introduction and
spread.
The objectives of the risk assessments undertaken in
each of the seven countries were to (i) specify the pathways
of HPAIV H5N1 introduction into poultry populations
and/or transmission within and between production sec-
tors, (ii) estimate in a transparent and systematic manner
the likelihood of introduction and/or spread of the disease
for each pathway, and (iii) identify the disease drivers and
optimal targets for risk mitigation. Country-specific risk
questions were formulated to reflect the national policy
makers priorities and the local epidemiological context, as
shown in Table 1. In the risk assessments, backyard farms
correspond to sector 4 farms, small- and medium-scale
farms to sector 3 farms, and large-scale farms to sector 1
and 2 farms as defined by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2011).
Primarily, a qualitative approach was adopted due to
the lack of data on both HPAI epidemiology and poultry
industries. All qualitative risk assessments followed the OIE
framework (World Organisation for Animal Health 2010),
risk pathways were defined in collaboration with national
stakeholders and experts, risk estimation was conducted
using six risk categories and one combination matrix and
uncertainty in the risk estimates was specified using three
categories (Costard et al. 2011). In addition, quantitative
risk assessment models were developed to estimate the risk
of between-farm HPAIV H5N1 transmission in one region
of Indonesia, and the risk of introduction into the buffer
zones around compartmentalized farms via fighting cocks
in Thailand (de Glanville et al. 2010; Prakarnkamanant
et al. 2011).
The key findings presented in Tables 2 and 3 sum-
marize the country-specific results described in project re-
ports (Kasemsuwan et al. 2009; Onkundi 2009; Siraw and
Chaka 2009; Turkson 2009; Abdu 2010; de Glanville et al.
2010; Idris et al. 2010; Prakarnkamanant et al. 2011; Mastin
et al. 2012). Some risk drivers for disease transmission were
common to three or more countries, while others were
specific to a given system or country (Tables 2, 3).
Small-scale and backyard farms were found at higher
risk of becoming infected than other farm types. However,
although the virus could easily escape from such low bio-
security farms, these farms were typically connected to few
other farms, resulting in relatively ‘‘local’’ disease spread.
Medium- and large-scale farms were considered at lower
risk of disease, but represented an important source of
disease dissemination in case of non-detection and
reporting or non-compliance with containment measures,
because they usually supplied a larger number of markets
and farms.
The risk assessments also provided recommendations
for the prevention and/or control of HPAI H5N1 within
the specific systems studied (region, country, area within a
country, production sectors). Generic targets for risk mit-
igation strategies included the implementation of biosecu-
rity practices by various stakeholders including animal
health workers, the enforcement of regulations and bans by
veterinary authorities, and farmer reporting and compli-
ance with containment measures. In Indonesia, an all-in
all-out management was recommended for commercial
farms. Studies highlighted issues such as who would bear
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Table 1. Risk questions formulated by national policy makers in the project countries.
HPAI H5N1
statusa
Country Risk question on the intro-
duction of HPAI H5N1 into
the country
Risk question on the transmission of HPAI H5N1 within or
between production sectors
Endemic Indonesia Not applicable Between small-scale broiler farms in the district and
municipality of Bogor
Nigeria Not applicable From backyard commercial farms to household free-range
poultry
From medium-scale farms to household free-range poultry
Vietnam Not applicable Transmission from live bird markets to small-scale farms
Eliminated Ghana From Burkina Faso, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, and Togo via
cross-border trade
Not done
Thailand Not applicable Introduction of infection into buffer zones surrounding
compartmentalized poultry farms, thereby from small-
scale and backyard farms to large-scale farms
Never reported Ethiopia By legal or illegal trade of
wild birds transiting
through Ethiopia
Between large and small-scale poultry farms
Kenya Not done Between backyard farms
From backyard to small-scale farms
From small-scale to backyard farms via sales of live birds
aAt the time of the study.
Table 2. Main risk drivers for HPAIV H5N1 transmission between premises identified in the risk assessments.
Risk driver Indonesia Nigeria Vietnam Ghana Thailand Ethiopia Kenya
Movement of people between premises in
the absence of biosecurity measuresa
X X X X X X X
Sharing of equipment X X X X X X
Trade of live poultry between premises X X X X X X X
Low containment of poultry on farmb X X X X X X
Under-reporting X X X X
Non-compliance with risk mitigation
measuresc
X X X X X
Non-respect of recommended biosecurity
measures by animal health workers and
vaccinators
X
Broiler harvest over more than one day X
Backyard farmers involved in cock fighting X
The table only includes risk drivers explicitly mentioned in each specific risk assessment studies. Since risk questions differed between countries, risk drivers not
mentioned in a given risk assessment are not necessarily absent in the country.
aPremises include farms and markets. Biosecurity measures for people include personal protective clothing, footbath at farm entrance, and cleaning and
disinfection of hands. Visitors such as traders were found to have little incentive to implement such measures, and small-scale farms typically did not have
facilities to ensure them.
bLow containment results in possibility of direct contact with wild or feral animals, and poultry from other flocks are likely.
cRisk mitigation measures varied between countries; non-compliance with them included: non-respect of movement restrictions, sales of poultry in spite of
ban, or improper disposal of dead birds. In Indonesia for example, the study found that the absence of an efficient compensation policy led farmers to not
declare suspicions and sell their poultry flocks instead.
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the cost associated with the implementation of those
measures, and of the lack of incentives for some stake-
holders who are involved in risky practices, such as col-
lectors. Most studies indicated that measures were needed
in small-scale farms, while recognizing the limited number
of options realistically available to poor farmers. In Ethi-
opia, the few large commercial farms supplying a high
number of medium- and small-scale farms were considered
key targets for prevention and control measures. The
Ghana and Vietnam studies pointed out the need to
understand poultry trade dynamics and drivers in the re-
gion, including informal trade. It also called for regional
communication and cooperation to better manage scarce
resources available for disease prevention and control by
harmonizing and enhancing measures at cross-border
points.
DISCUSSION
The results of the country risk assessments allowed iden-
tifying system-specific risk pathways which are essential for
informing the development of meaningful risk mitigation
strategies. It is recognized that all seven country studies
were compromised by significant data gaps. But by
adopting a formal risk assessment process, the most
important data gaps could be identified and resulting
uncertainties in relation to risk estimates were expressed.
The information improved the ability of policy makers to
design the most appropriate risk mitigation strategies. It
needs to be kept in mind that with a highly infectious
disease such as HPAI H5N1, policy development cannot be
delayed until more data has been collected since disease
spread needs to be restricted as quickly as possible.
Most risk drivers identified in the risk assessments are
strongly influenced by human behavior, which means that
risk mitigation policies will require some element of human
behavior change. The drivers of such behavior are usually
poorly understood, since they are affected by a large
number of interdependent mechanisms that represent a
range of scientific domains which are currently only rarely
investigated in an integrated fashion. It is, therefore, no
surprise that the impact of interventions on the local sys-
tems as a whole, rather than just the biological aspects, is
usually not known. In this context, there is an urgent need
to better understand the value chains, and the drivers of
associated human behavior, for example at producer, tra-
der, and consumer level. Economic and social studies need
to be conducted to describe incentives and constraints
determining actions. The power relationships between the
different stakeholders need to be researched, and the con-
sequences of policies in terms of socio-cultural acceptability
and economic impact need to be examined.
Some of the risk assessments highlighted that the wide
variation in socio-economic status within and between
countries in a region is an important driver for disease risk.
This emphasizes the need for complementing national with
regional strategies for dealing with HPAI H5N1 so that
long-term effective solutions can be identified. For exam-
ple, Thailand and Vietnam do not share a common border,
but there is very likely some degree of poultry-associated
trade between them, although it is not allowed officially.
Disease risk in one therefore influences disease risk in the
other, and supply and demand for poultry will determine
direction of product flow, which needs to be taken into
account when developing risk mitigation measures. Indo-
nesia’s HPAIV infection dynamics on the other hand are
probably purely driven by within-country spread, as shown
by the lack of change in molecular clades since first intro-
duction between 2004 and 2011 (Pfeiffer et al. 2011). In
resource-poor settings, pragmatic decisions need to be
made taking into account economic and technical feasi-
bility as well as likely impact of different control options.
The use of vaccination is an example of this decision
problem. Thailand, with its mix of backyard to integrated
commercial poultry industry, was able to eradicate HPAI
H5N1 using a range of measures with high economic and
Table 3. Main risk drivers for HPAIV H5N1 introduction into
the country, identified in the risk assessments conducted in Ghana
and Ethiopia under the Pro-poor HPAI Risk Reduction project.
Risk driver Ghana Ethiopia
Absence of reliable veterinary check
at airport/borders
X X
No appropriate holding facilities at
airport
X
No enforcement of ban on imports X
Large volume and frequency of
informal cross-border trade of
poultry and poultry products
X
The table only includes risk drivers explicitly mentioned in each specific risk
assessment. Since risk questions differed between the two countries, risk
drivers not mentioned in a given risk assessment are not necessarily absent in
the country.
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social impact including large-scale culling of infected
poultry, movement ban, and extremely intensive disease
surveillance. Vietnam and Indonesia, on the other hand,
had to use vaccination in addition to a wide range of other
measures such as surveillance, culling, and movement
control to reduce the extremely high infection pressure in a
primarily backyard to small-scale poultry production sys-
tem.
An important lesson from the HPAI H5N1 epidemics
has been the recognition that the likelihood of successful
prevention and control of infectious disease spread is
strongly influenced by human behavior. Traditionally,
animal health policies are developed by experts associated
with the veterinary profession who are able to design risk
mitigation strategies that very effectively deal with the
biological aspects of risk pathways. If the regulatory envi-
ronment is able to ensure universal compliance, the
objectives of these policies are likely to be achieved.
Unfortunately, universal compliance can rarely—if ever—
be reached, and it is, therefore, necessary to study factors
influencing compliance behavior in the systems where the
policy is to be applied, as demonstrated in other contexts
(Herzfeld and Jongeneel 2012; Ramcilovic-Suominen and
Hansen 2012).
The country studies also demonstrated that the likeli-
hood for risk assessments to translate into effective risk
mitigation policies can be substantially increased if, from
the start, they involve multidisciplinary teams. These
should ideally comprise individuals with expertise in the
various scientific disciplines needed to appropriately
understand the risk pathways and their system-specific
drivers, as well as key stakeholders. In the case of infectious
zoonotic diseases, such experts include not only epidemi-
ologists, and other biomedical experts, but also animal
production systems experts, economists and social
anthropologists. The involvement of a risk assessor or risk
assessment facilitator would also be critical to bridge be-
tween the different expertises and integrate them into the
specification of risk pathways and the estimation of risk. It
is essential to also recognize the importance of local
knowledge, scientific or not, as well as the involvement of
risk managers. There has been a tendency to over-empha-
size the importance of separating risk assessment from
management, often resulting in ineffective communication
between risk assessors and managers, and impeding the use
of risk assessments for policy development (2009). The
roles of different institutions and stakeholders should thus
be recognized under the broad concept of risk governance
(Renn et al. 2011). This term is probably more appropriate
than risk analysis to describe this integrative and interdis-
ciplinary process, as it emphasizes the need for inclusive
action rather than ‘‘just’’ analysis. While comprehensive
stakeholder involvement is an important ambition to aim
for, it is not easy to implement, as a result of political,
cultural, and socio-economic factors. In most instances, the
policy makers engaged in our research were national gov-
ernmental institutions. The stakeholder groups involved in
the risk assessments usually consisted primarily of this same
group, and they also decided on which risk question to
address in the risk assessment. It became apparent that
effective risk governance will require government authori-
ties in the affected countries to place more emphasis on
establishing effective and inclusive stakeholder dialog.
Mechanisms for achieving participation need to be tailored
to local circumstances, and are likely to differ from those
appropriate in high income countries where broad stake-
holder participation is easier to achieve due to much more
homogeneous levels of education and communication
mechanisms.
In conclusion, the HPAI H5N1 emergence situation
and its endemicity in some countries despite a major dis-
ease control effort has demonstrated the need for integrated
approaches to risk assessment and management under the
broad concept of risk governance. Changes in the policy
making environment are required; it needs to become more
participatory through active stakeholder engagement and
an interdisciplinary perspective on how risk can be effec-
tively and sustainably mitigated needs to be adopted.
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